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Qu'ils mangent des contrats: Rethinking Justice in EU Contract Law   
 
G. de Búrca, D. Kochenov and A.Williams (eds.), EUROPE'S JUSTICE DEFICIT? (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2014, forthcoming). 
Abstract – The concern for justice in the context of EU contract law was central to a scholarly 
initiative that led, in 2004, to the publication of a Social Justice Manifesto. The Manifesto had 
the explicit goal of steering the Commission’s harmonization agenda away from purely 
neoliberal goals and towards a socially conscious law of private exchange. Contract law would 
be designed at the EU level so as to become (or remain, depending on the baseline of each 
member state) palatable to weaker parties. Today, in the many parts of Europe devastated by 
rising poverty, dire unemployment rates, and collapsing social safety nets, the Manifesto needs 
to be revised. When the very access to the market place is foreclosed by indigence and 
marginalization, the promise of contracts that would be sweet toward the vulnerable has the 
flavour of Marie Antoinette’s brioche. This essay revisits the situational premises of the 
Manifesto, acknowledges its accomplishments, identifies its limits, and outlines possibilities for 
its renewal, both within its original framework and beyond.  
Introduction – 
The Social Justice Manifesto, published in 2004, was a welcome moment of reflection upon the 
yet undefined trajectory of EU Contract Law.2 The concern underlying the Manifesto was that 
the Commission would spearhead a technocratic, undemocratic, and yet definitely ideological 
project of private law harmonization – a project geared towards the neoliberal triumph of private 
autonomy, and functionally justified only by the goal of driving down the cost of interstate 
transactions.  It is important to locate historically both the Manifesto and the project that the 
Manifesto aimed to oppose. Beginning with the Communication on European Contract Law of 
July 2001,3 and continuing with the Action Plan of October 2003,4 the Commission seemed 
poised to launch an ultimately non-sectoral reform of contract law, aimed at bringing ‘coherence’ 
among different legal systems and harmonizing their guiding rules and principles.5 The seeming 
neutrality of such values as coherence and uniformity could not hide the fact that the project was 
                                                            
1 Professor of Law, Boston University. 
2 Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, ‘Social Justice in European Contract Law: a Manifesto’ 
(2004) 10 European Law Journal 653, 663-664.  
3 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European 
contract law’ COM (2001) 398 final. 
4 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission of 12 February 2003 to the European Parliament and the 
Council - A more coherent European contract law - An action plan’ COM (2003) 68 final. 
5 S R Weatherill, ‘The Consumer Rights Directive: how and why a quest for “coherence” has (largely) failed’ (2012) 
49 CML Rev 1279. 
2 
 
mainly about making life easier for businesses operating across borders.6 The risk was that 
harmonization would resuscitate the myth of untrammeled private autonomy, and at the same 
time erode those private law mechanisms, variously devised through the 20th century by state 
legislators, courts and agencies, that redressed power imbalances and protected weaker parties.  
It was therefore important to mobilise the base of private law scholars concerned with questions 
of distributive justice – or ‘social’ justice as it was more palatably christened by the Manifesto’s 
authors. The Manifesto highlighted important themes. It noted that private law had an expressive 
function and needed to reflect the socio-economic complexities of modern societies;7 that it was 
a tool for social engineering, and therefore had to be designed with the full consultation of all 
relevant stakeholders by means of fully democratic processes;8 and that it had to dovetail with 
welfare structures that varied a great deal across the different member states.9  
In hindsight, the project was of the constructive type. It seemed inspired by the belief that the 
harmonization of contract law, if handled properly and guarded from neoliberal hijacking, could 
be done well and might achieve laudable goals. L’esprit du temps nurtured this optimistic streak. 
The EU was then on the verge of a dramatic expansion, with all the promises of enlargement in 
full display and none of its (un)intended consequences yet in sight. A supranational constitution, 
harbinger of political convergence and infused with goals of democracy and solidarity, was then 
in the making. And in matters of contracts a number of legislative measures had already brought 
a moralizing, social tone to the incipient sales law of the EU.10 The Manifesto signaled a deeper 
entrenchment of a particular type of contract law scholarship in the constituent bodies of EU 
contract law, making sure that its values would not be ignored.  And indeed they weren’t. 
Procedurally, the drafting of new texts involved the work of scholars affiliated with the Social 
Justice project.11 Substantively, the voice of the Manifesto would be heard in subsequent 
enactments, beginning with Directive 2005/29 concerning unfair commercial practices, which 
outlawed a number of marketing techniques still permissible in the United States.12 The ‘Recast’ 
Brussels I Regulation, scheduled to enter into force in 2015, reigns in private autonomy in 
                                                            
6 According to the Commission’s Action Plan, in the Common Frame of Reference ‘contractual freedom should be 
the guiding principle; restrictions should only be foreseen where this could be justified with good reasons’. 
7 ‘[S]ince the market plays an increasingly important role in securing distributive justice for the citizens of Europe, it 
is vital that its basic regulatory framework –the private law of contract—should embrace a scheme of social justice 
that secures a widespread acceptance.’ Manifesto (n 2) 673. 
8 Martijn Hesselink, ‘The Politics of a European Civil Code’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 675; Daniela Caruso, 
‘Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration: The Case of Property’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 
751. 
9 Thomas Wilhelmsson, ‘Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract Law’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 712, 
713. 
10 Most notably, Directive 85/577/EEC on doorstep selling, Directive 97/7/EC on distance selling, Directive 
93/13/EC on Unfair Contract Terms and Directive 99/44/EC on consumer sales and guarantees. 
11 The Draft Common Frame of Reference (an opus of 4795 pages) was ‘prepared by the Study Group on a 
European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group).’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf 
12  Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and 
amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC and Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) [2005] OJ L149/22. 
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matters of choice of forum when one of the parties is a consumer, an insured, or an individual 
employee. 13  The explicit justification for this departure from freedom of contract is the assumed 
vulnerability of such parties. In the same vein, Commission proposals continue to ban pre-
dispute arbitration clauses14 – a practice that some observers deem fanatically pro-consumer and 
blind to business needs.15 More generally, as a matter of course the process of producing new 
contract law instruments involves balancing autonomy with other values, such as the protection 
of weaker parties.16  
In many ways, therefore, Social Justice scholars can take pride in a job well done and in their 
well established presence. There is a sense, however, in which the Manifesto has fallen victim to 
its own success, as well as to the unfolding of the Euro saga. It is time, therefore, to reassess 
critically the 2004 Manifesto along two lines – one internal to the project, and one external. 
 
Internal Critique and Suggestions from Within - 
Perils of Deliberation - The Manifesto, as noted, placed much faith in the possibilities of 
deliberative processes. Several commentators belaboured the point that EU private law had to be 
drafted with the full participation of multiple stake holders.17  This emphasis on process had the 
side effect of substantive ambivalence. The Manifesto aptly noted that views on social justice 
were radically different within Europe, and that developing one coherent understanding of 
contract law in the context of multiple welfare models might prove impossible.18 Thomas 
Wilhelmsson was particularly aware of ‘internal conflicts within the welfarist perspective’:  
What from one point of view may be clearly seen as a welfarist measure, may from some other 
point of view be regarded as fairly doubtful example. For example, … from the point of view of 
distributive justice, [precontractual information rules in credit contracts] are problematic, as they 
                                                            
13 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, [2012] OJ L 351/1. 
14 Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on Online Dispute Resolution for 
Consumer Disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2044 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on 
Consumer ODR) COM (2011) 794/2; see also Art. 84(d) of the Commission Proposal for a Regulation on Common 
European Sales Law COM (2011) 635 final. This proposal pays enough attention to consumer protection as to 
generate the ire of efficiency-minded commentators: R. Epstein ‘'Harmonization, heterogeneity and regulation: 
CESL, the lost opportunity for constructive harmonization', (2013) 50 CML Rev 207. 
15 Mohammed Azam Aslam, ‘B-2-C Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses, E-Commerce Trust Construction and Jenga: 
'Keeping Every Cog and Wheel' (2013) Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology (forthcoming). 
16 Norbert Reich and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, ‘Crónica de una muerte anunciada: The Commission Proposal for a 
‘Directive on Consumer Rights’’ (2009) 46 CML Rev 471-519. 
17 Hesselink (n 8).  
18 ‘Although the idea of a European model of the social market has gained some currency, at least in contrast to an 
American model of capitalism, there remains considerable divergences in views about how the details of this model 
should be articulated and systematised. Indeed, the existing differences between national systems for providing 
social welfare and steering market outcomes cast some doubt on the possibility of defining even in abstract terms a 
convincing interpretation of the European model of the social market. Thus there is a need to build a consensus 
around the appropriate principles of a social market.’ Manifesto (n 2) 673 (emphasis added). 
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tend to improve the position of strong consumers, while offering little help to the more vulnerable 
ones. 19 
Wilhelmsson then proceeded to assess the contract law acquis, as it was in 2004, in light of an 
articulate taxonomy of welfare models.  He found that existing EU instruments – in particular the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive – already embraced welfarism, but only in one of its 
manifestations: the market-rational type, whereby consumer rationality is enhanced by deeper 
knowledge, wider choice, and ability to repent from occasional lapses of wisdom.20 This meant 
that alternative forms of welfarism – especially those focused on redistribution and extreme 
vulnerability – had not yet surfaced in EU contract law, and might never see the light of day.  
Over the decade following the publication of the Manifesto, social justice has grown lato sensu 
more visible in the discourse of EU contract law. Yet, its most important feature – its emphasis 
on the distributive potential of contract rules and principles – has not yet gained the visibility one 
might expect. The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR),21 while embracing ‘justice’ as 
‘an all pervading principle … not lightly to be displaced,’22 pays minimal homage to distributive 
goals23  and candidly reveals the absence of consensus on what such goals might entail: 
[D]ifferent readers may have different interpretations of, and views on, the extent to which the 
DCFR suggests the correction of market failures or contains elements of ‘social justice’ and 
protection for weaker parties.24 
Of course such petites differénces are truly ‘irreconcilable visions of humanity and society,’25 
and no reconciliation is, to this day, in sight. In some passages, the DCFR drafters seem to doubt 
the very possibility of defining justice: 
Justice is hard to define, impossible to measure and subjective at the edges, but clear cases of 
injustice are universally recognised and universally abhorred.  
‘We know it when we see it’ is not much of a yield after a decade of deliberation. With justice so 
neutralised, the public/private distinction resurfaces, albeit softened by ‘however’ clauses:26  
                                                            
19 Wilhelmsson (n 9). 
20 ‘If welfarism is understood as signifying mandatory rules protecting the alleged weaker party to the contract, … 
then practically the whole contract law acquis is of this kind[. … We] cannot avoid questions such as: welfarist in 
what respect, from what point of view?’ Wilhelmsson (n 9) 714. 
21 Study Group on a European Civil Code and Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group), Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) 
Outline Edition (Sellier European Law Publishers, 2012). 
22 Ibid. 
23 ‘The promotion of solidarity and social responsibility is not absent from the private law rules in the DCFR.’ 
24 DCFR Outline Edition (n 21). 
25 Duncan Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685.  
26 Giuseppe Bellantuono, ‘The Limits of Contract Law in the Regulatory State’ (2010) 6 European Review of 
Contract Law 115 118 (‘The DCFR follows the traditional view that gives prominence to the interests of contractual 
parties and leaves to different branches of law the task of fulfiling other goals, for example … the distribution of 
resources to less wealthy classes.’) 
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The promotion of solidarity and social responsibility is generally regarded as primarily the 
function of public law (using, for example, criminal law, tax law and social welfare law) rather 
than private law. However, the promotion of solidarity and social responsibility is not absent 
from the private law rules in the DCFR.27 
At an operational level, the DCFR articulates ‘justice’ as a series of absolutely classical 
‘qualifications on freedom of contract,’ such as ‘ensuring that like are treated alike.’28 With a 
nod to the Manifesto, the DCFR does raise the issue of social vulnerability.29 The category of 
‘the vulnerable’, however, soon collapses onto the socio-economically neutral notion of 
‘consumer’30 – an admittedly dissatisfying proxy for bargaining weakness,31 and definitely not a 
proxy for low income or marginalization. Pre-contractual duties to disclose, or post-contractual 
rights to repent, are only meant to expand and deepen the range of private autonomy. There is 
nothing truly redistributive here, and as always, diligentibus jura succurrunt. The truly 
vulnerable, i.e. those incapable of self-care and due diligence, find little solace in such measures. 
In hindsight, the Manifesto’s main flaw seems to lie in its excessive faith in deliberation and in 
its ambivalent stance in point of distributive justice. It contained no recipe for identifying weaker 
parties, and embraced no specific redistributive model. Unsurprisingly, given the multitude of 
interests involved in developing contract law at EU level, the concept of social justice has 
remained as vague and inconclusive as it was ten years ago. 
Going forward, Social Justice scholars could decide simply to sharpen their focus: insist on the 
distributive impact of contract law rules and on linkages between markets and welfare;32 
continue to monitor the progress of the Commission towards the adoption of uniform contract 
law instruments; and make sure that such instruments contain enough protection for ‘vulnerable’ 
parties. The problem with this course of action is that it might have already delivered all the 
goods one might ask of it, given its boundaries, its vagueness, and its faith in pluralist 
deliberation. The question is whether more can be done within the boundaries of contract law 
harmonization. I will outline some possibilities here, before moving to consider whether the 
quest for social justice, at this particular historical and political juncture, should rather keep one 
foot firmly outside the realm of contracts. 
 
                                                            
27 DCFR Outline Edition (n 21). 
28 Ibid. 
29 ‘Many of the qualifications on freedom of contract mentioned above can also be explained as rules designed to 
protect the vulnerable.’ Ibid. 
30 ‘Within the DCFR the main example of this aspect of justice is the special protection afforded to consumers.’ 
Ibid. 
31 ‘Whether the notion of the consumer is necessarily the best way of identifying those in need of special protection 
is a question which has been raised and will no doubt be raised again.’  Ibid. 
32 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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Zooming onto vulnerable consumers – In February 2013, the European Consumer Consultative 
Group (ECCG) issued an interesting and detailed ‘Opinion on consumers and vulnerability.’33 
The Opinion contains a list of recommendations, seemingly an ideal blueprint for a newly 
reconfigured social justice manifesto. The ECCG aptly departs from the notion of average 
consumer and attempts to identify specific markers of weakness, such as illness and disability. 34 
It conceives of vulnerability as a trap into which anybody can fall at some point during their 
lifetime, and recommends therefore a flexible approach to each specific circumstance. In 
contracts jargon, this is a plea for general clauses and case-by-case adjudication. The Opinion 
also names specific services which should be universally guaranteed (e.g. internet access) and 
others which should not be handled via autonomous market transactions (e.g. home heating). 
Most notably, the Opinion recommends conducting empirical studies to verify whether existing 
mechanisms for the protection of weaker parties (e.g. disclosure mandates or the ability to switch 
to alternative service providers) are indeed effective. This emphasis on empirical studies echoes 
analogous suggestions recently made by prominent contract scholars in the United States, and in 
particular by Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar in their commentary to the proposed Common 
European Sales Law (CESL).35 The point of such suggestions is that the regulation of private 
autonomy – through mandatory clauses, black lists or disclosure duties – is only warranted where 
market failures and systemic harms to consumers have been documented via statistically relevant 
studies. The ECCG opinion is less worried about unduly constraining private autonomy, and 
rather focuses on identifying new areas of vulnerability, but the bottom line is identical: more 
data is needed in order to make sure that distributive justice is achieved in consumer transactions.  
 
Producing better knowledge – To be sure, the Commission has engaged for a while in empirical 
studies of the EU market. It did produce an impact assessment before issuing the CESL proposal, 
and the assessment is rife with data. The sort of data that the Commission chose to gather is, 
however, peculiar. First, a lot of the information that was assembled is qualitative. Firm 
managers, for instance, were asked to state whether the fragmentation of contract law in the EU 
was a hindrance to pursuing inter-state marketing strategies. Replies to this question were then 
given numerical codes depending on whether the hindrance was reportedly severe, non-existent, 
or something in between.  This is how managers’ impressions, whether or not supported by hard 
evidence, were converted into hard numbers, and eventually into an accurate-sounding 
measurement of the loss of business attributable to legal fragmentation.36  
                                                            
33 European Consumer Consultative Group, ‘Opinion on consumers and vulnerability’ (2013) 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/empowerment/docs/eccg_opinion_consumers_vulnerability_022013_en.pdf 
34 The ECCG opinion cites the work of Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘Do consumers and businesses need a new architecture of 
consumer law?’ (2012) EUI working papers, law 2012/23, 22. 
35 Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, ‘Regulatory techniques in consumer protection: A critique of European 
consumer contract law’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 109. 
36 The Commission’s use of qualitative interviews has attracted sharp critiques. See James Boyle, ‘Two database 
cheers for the EU’ Financial Times (London, 2 January 2006). 
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Second, there was no attempt whatsoever at locating the polled firms or consumers in their socio-
economic or even simply national context. Interviewees are de-nationalised and anonymous. The 
assessment collects data on whether firms deal with customers in one, two, or more EU 
countries, but it does not specify which countries these are, and the vectors of import-export 
forces within Europe – their directionality or intensity – are nowhere to be seen. Data have no 
granularity and are systematically aggregate. A nod to firms’ relative market power is found only 
once, in the statement that legal fragmentation is likely to impose higher costs on firms with 
lower bargaining power in B2B transactions. This is because leading firms are likely to impose 
their own choice of law onto their weaker counterparts, placing onto them the burden of 
acquiring legal knowledge.37 The implication of this assumption is that the uniformity of sales 
law would equalise the playing field to the benefit of weaker traders. But with the exception of 
this casual remark, the entire assessment is controlled by the presumption that strengths and 
weaknesses are evenly distributed throughout the Union. 
In complete contrast to such aggregate data, the pioneering work of Ian Ayres on the impact of 
race and gender in car-sales dynamics comes to mind as a source of inspiration:38 identical 
contract rules can hurt some groups of consumers (or businesses39) and benefit others.40 
Interestingly, many other areas of EU policy are supported by highly differentiated, granular and 
particularised inquiries. REGIO, for instance, is a DG where by definition the analysis of socio-
economic dynamics is localised and context-specific. But when it comes to establishing the basis 
for internal market legislation, the Commission intentionally blends different realities into 
statistical averages, and takes median values as its legislative basis. This is not the place and time 
to belabour the resilience of the public-private distinction in EU law, but it is indeed curious that 
when it comes to drafting the law of the market, an enormous pile of economic data showing 
socio-economic asymmetries can be brushed aside.  
While containing several innovative proposals, the ECCG Opinion is completely aligned with 
the 2004 Manifesto when it conceives of market transactions as governed by uniform laws for all 
consumers and all businesses throughout Europe; it aims, once again, at producing Bürgerliches 
Recht, with emphasis on an EU-wide, undifferentiated citizen in an undifferentiated market 
context. There is something eternally appealing about a uniform law for a unified market 
populated by indistinguishable actors. Its philosophical pedigree is both enlightened (insofar as it 
                                                            
37 In contrast, in B2C transactions, even large firms can be constrained by the consumer protection regime to which 
their customers are entitled. 
38 Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman, ‘Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car’ (1995) 85 
American Economic Review 304. 
39 Ian Ayres, Fredrick E. Vars, and Nasser Zakariya, ‘To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping’ 
(2005) 114 Yale Law Journal 1613 (documenting customer-side discrimination in tipping cab drivers). 
40 Sellers’ ability to pass along the cost of regulation to consumers varies greatly depending on such factors as brand 
loyalty, which is lower in emerging economies. See, eg Ali Riza Apil, ‘Foreign Product Perceptions and Country of 
Origin Analysis across Black Sea; Studies on Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, and Turkey’ (2006) 1 IBSU 
International Refereed Multi-disciplinary Scientific Journal 22, 31 (‘In [developing countries such as Romania] 
consumers typically perceive foreign products, particular those made in higher origin countries, as being of higher 
quality than domestic products.’). 
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enables individual autonomy) and romantic (insofar as it generates communities tied together by 
a shared set of norms). It is unsurprising that new member states would want to endorse the 
project of uniform market rules, thereby signaling their full embrace of the Union’s goals and 
their true belonging. The idea grows all the more appealing when uniformity makes room for 
vulnerability – again, a horizontal and ubiquitous category – and softens its rules to embrace it. 
The cold neoclassical assumption by which the two parties to a transaction are formally equal 
(B=C) is replaced by the warm acknowledgment of unequal bargaining power in consumer 
transactions (B>C), and the rules are adjusted accordingly.  
In the aftermath of the Euro-crisis, however, one can detect a few signs of dissatisfaction with 
even the most vulnerability-friendly versions of uniform laws for the EU market. The bond 
spreads, brought to the attention of the EU public since the start of the sovereign debt crisis and 
accompanied by dramatic charts in all media forms, have provided a clear and vivid illustration 
of the socio-economic cleavages plaguing the internal market.  One critique, recently phrased by 
Damjan Kukovec, is that any attempt at uniform regulation of the EU market is necessarily blind 
to the differences between the Socio-Economic Centres and the socio-economic peripheries of 
the Union.41 Kukovec questions the overall edifice of EU law as based on a ‘rhetoric of common 
interest,’ and therefore not equipped to even acknowledge – let alone redress – the pernicious 
distributive consequences of European integration. Others have addressed directly the issue of 
private law harmonization.42 The uniform regulation of contract law throughout a socio-
economically diverse market reproduces, in fact, a fundamental feature of laissez faire – namely, 
its indifference by design to the socioeconomic diversity of the market. Ironically, member states 
experienced the progressive socialization and embedding of their private laws in the 20th century, 
but the EU is now reviving the nineteenth-century habit of insulating the law of private 
autonomy from the larger question of systemic inequality.43 Can the Social Justice project 
internalise such critiques and augment its project accordingly? 
  
Making up for Asymmetries – In the abstract, it would be possible to acknowledge the 
distributive pitfalls of uniform law and to resist any further Europeanization of contract law. 
Conscious of the regrettable distributive dynamics of harmonization, some scholars have 
considered shifting from uniform rules to a much looser system of coordination among different 
                                                            
41 Damjan Kukovec, ‘A Critique of the Rhetoric of Common Interest in the European Union Legal Discourse’ (The 
European Legal Project: New Approaches conference, Harvard University, April 2012). 
http://www.harvardiglp.org/new-thinking-new-writing/a-critique-of-rhetoric/. 
42 See, e.g. Florian Rödl, ‘Private Law, Democracy, Codification. A Critique of the European Law Project’, in 
Christian Jörges and Tommi Ralli (eds), European Constitutionalism without Private Law— Private Law without 
Democracy, RECON Report No 14, ARENA Report 3/11, 141 (Oslo, 2011); C Jörges and C Schmid, ‘Towards 
Proceduralization of Private Law in the European Multi-Level System’ in Arthur Hartkamp (ed), Towards a 
European Civil Code, 4th edn (Kluwer Law International, 2011) 277; and Daniela Caruso, ‘The Baby and the Bath 
Water’ (2013) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law. 
43 Rödl (n 42) 151. 
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Other private law systems within a procedural ‘conflicts’ model.44 Others have posited that any 
problems stemming from legal diversity should be handled through spontaneous processes of self 
regulation.45 Social justice scholars, however, would probably be reluctant to leave the law of the 
EU market to such local devices, either because of their propensity for centralised market 
regulation46 or due to their cosmopolitan, anti-nationalist instincts.47 But if the reflection on the 
private laws of the EU market must continue, then a generic focus on horizontal vulnerability is 
not enough, and a closer, more granular understanding of the market – of its many Centres and 
its many peripheries – can no longer be postponed.  
The point is not to stop working on uniform laws for the market. The prevention of fraud to the 
consumer, a sensible regulation of access to credit, and the outlawing of predatory marketing 
practices, remain important icons of social justice. The point is to establish an ideological 
counterpoint to the win-win narrative that has already inspired and justified a number of 
harmonization projects – including the adoption of a single currency. The uneven costs and 
benefits of contract law harmonization must be tracked and measured. Losers must be identified, 
and helped out of the predicament of false autonomy. Compensatory mechanisms specifically 
designed to redress the uneven costs of compliance with uniform laws may have to be devised 
outside the boundaries of contract law (more on this point below). 
 
Contracts and Competence Creep - Employment, housing, and access to credit are essential 
aspects of social justice insofar as they are necessary to secure a set of basic entitlements. These 
fundamental aspects of the human condition had been heavily regulated for over a century by 
means of state contract law – a practice that the Treaty of Lisbon, leaving economic and social 
policy outside the scope of harmonization, promised to leave untouched. It is now clear that the 
financial crisis and the measures taken in its aftermath – in particular the conditions attached to 
‘rescue’ measures meant to save insolvent states from bankruptcy – have deeply eroded both 
private autonomy and the regulatory capacity of the state in such matters.48 The nature of 
employment contracts has been radically altered.49 Post-employment benefits and pensions have 
been renegotiated with no regard to pre-existing obligations. The Italian ‘esodati’ have been left 
                                                            
44 Jörges and Schmidt (n 42) 295 (‘The [Commission’s strategy of full harmonization] is at odds with the socio-
economic diversity [now deepening] in Europe. In view of this diversity, the imposition of uniform rules on the 
balancing of market development and consumer demand do not make economic sense. They also risk the destruction 
of the social fabric of markets and consumption which remains … characterised by national contexts.’) 
45 Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘Reframing Self-Regulation in European Private Law’ (Kluwer Law International, 2006). 
46 The charge of ‘statism’, moved against the whole project of contract law harmonization, comes from Richard 
Epstein, 'Harmonization, heterogeneity and regulation: CESL, the lost opportunity for constructive harmonization' 
[2013] CML Rev 207. 
47 See R Sefton-Green, ‘French and English crypto-nationalism and European private law’ (2012) 8 European 
Review of Contract Law 260. 
48 Philomila Tsoukala, ‘The Euro Zone Crisis and the Future of Social Europe’ (2013) __ Columbia Journal of 
European Law __; Damian Chalmers, ‘The European Redistributive State and a European Law of Struggle’ (2012) 
18 European Law Journal 666, 667. 
49 Labour law reforms in Italy and Spain, more or less directed from Brussels, have been particularly far-reaching.  
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to wonder about the meaning of sanctity of contracts. Collapsing state and local budgets have 
caused housing subsidies to shrink, leaving vulnerable tenants to the vagaries of under-regulated 
landlord-tenant agreements. And in many corners of Europe borrowers have been deprived of 
financial lifelines.  In response to the bursting of the housing bubble, the EU has taken upon 
itself the role of regulating access to mortgages, again affecting the state’s regulation of the 
housing market in dramatic and unprecedented ways.50 In sum, the crisis has led to a de-facto 
expansion of EU competences in matters of contract law, and the regulatory capacity of states 
and local government has shrunk accordingly. ‘Social Justice in Contract Law’ must now look at 
much more than consumer protection. Its agenda must embrace contracts that secure housing, 
employment and access to credit, and it must stay nimble: on one hand, it needs to work 
alongside the EU legislator when Brussels seems appropriate – or inevitable – as a locus of 
intervention; on the other hand, it must protect well-functioning local arrangements from 
supranational interference.   In either case, the plot must thicken. The aforementioned contracts 
affect, much more directly than on-line shopping, the life of vulnerable subjects and must be 
placed, at a time of increasing Europeanization, firmly at the centre of the social justice agenda. 
 
The External Critique: beyond contract law –  
Whither contracts? -  At the time of the Bolkenstein proposal, much work was done to keep 
services of general interest outside of the liberalization agenda of the Commission.51 Current 
versions of that political battle are to be found in the attempt to reconcile the ongoing 
liberalization of the energy market with price control and subsidised utility rates for the poor.52 
The gist of these battles is resisting the privatization of important relationships and modes of 
supply. Beginning in the late ‘80s, many such battles were lost. Commenting on the White Paper 
on the Internal Market, Joseph Weiler pointed out that embracing the market was a particular 
ideological choice that would inform and transform, irreversibly, the ethos of the Community.53  
Marija Bartl’s sophisticated analysis of ‘market rationality’ lucidly portrays the EU’s normative 
lens as heavily controlled by notions of consumerism and efficiency, and notes that the lens has 
systemically distortive effects.54 These critiques resonate loudly within contract law discourse. 
EU law-making in contract law is premised on the assumption that contracts are the essence of 
human exchange across national borders, and that a seamless network of private agreements is a 
                                                            
50 The proposed ‘Directive on Credit Agreements relating to residential Property credit to purchase a home’ contains 
strong limitations on autonomy: credit simply cannot be given if mandatory assessment (conducted by lender) 
proves negative (Art. 14(2) of proposal). 
51 Wolfgang Kowalsky, ‘The Services Directive: the legislative process clears the first hurdle’ (2006) 12 European 
Review of Labour and Research 231. 
52 Commission Communication, ‘Making the internal energy market work’ COM/2012/0663 final. While the 
Commission sees subsidised electricity cost as a function of states’ social policies, and is opposed to price control, 
the ECCG recommends ‘social tariffs’ (ECCG opinion (n 33) 12). 
53 Joseph HH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403, 2477. 
54 Marija Bartl, ‘Market Rationality, Private Law and the Direction of the Union: Resuscitating the Market as the 
Object of the Political’ (2013) European Law Journal (forthcoming) (manuscript on file). 
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necessary and perhaps even sufficient condition of European unity. This is, again, a particular 
normative lens that risks framing and distorting the discourse on cross-border exchanges. A 
Social Justice project that is meant to be a critical voice should not reinforce such distortions and 
should not let ‘contract’ alone dictate the frame of reference in EU law.  
Property, Family, and Association – The protection of the vulnerable, in the private law tradition 
of continental Europe, takes place in multiple sites. Entering contracts for goods and services is 
one way to fulfill basic needs, and the 2004 Manifesto aptly focused on contracts because in this 
field, thanks to the capacious reach of the internal market clause,55 the EU had conquered much 
legislative territory. But there is much more in private law than contracts. Current proposals for a 
European Foundation Statute56 may be paving the way for EU-wide redistribution of private 
wealth through the channel of charity.57 Monitoring such initiatives through the lens of social 
justice and nurturing their development in the form of secondary legislation should be a feature 
of a new Manifesto. 
Family and property law can also be designed so as to assist individuals in times of weakness, 
and have served this function in some member states more than others.58 Family and property are 
areas in which direct harmonization is largely not allowed by primary EU law, for reasons that 
range from principled stance to rent-seeking entrenchment.59 The result of this competence 
divide is a regrettable hollowing out of EU law scholarship.60 For instance, the ongoing debate 
about ‘common goods,’ a desirable mode of ownership for such resources as water or cultural 
sites,61 runs on a scholarly track that is entirely parallel to EU discourse.62 It involves domestic 
property scholars, comparative law experts, and even human rights activists from the Council of 
Europe, but it has not yet directly engaged EU law circles.63 When water features in Commission 
                                                            
55 Now TFEU Article 114. 
56 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/eufoundation/index_en.htm (proposal for a European Foundation 
Statute to make it easier to pursue public interest goals of EU-wide scope). 
57 Lillian Faulhaber, ‘Tax Expenditures, Charitable Giving, and the Fiscal Future of the European Union’ (2013) ___ 
Yale Journal of International Law ____; See the Opinion of the Committee on Culture and Education for the 
Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposal for a Council regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation (FE), 
April 26, 2013. 
58 Philomila Tsoukala, ‘Family Portrait of a Greek Tragedy’ New York Times (New York, 24 April 2010). 
59 See the timid introduction of legislative competence in matters of family law in 1999 with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1999), now in TFEU Art. 81, or the protection of nationalization projects guaranteed by the Treaty of 
Rome in what is now TFEU Art. 345.  
60 The focus on the logic of the market also tends to obscure the redistributive dynamics of different family law 
regimes. See Fernanda Nicola, ‘Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law’ (2010) 58 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 777. 
61 See, e.g. Commissione Rodotà - per la modifica delle norme del codice civile in materia di beni pubblici (2007), 
http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_12_1.wp?contentId=SPS47617.  
62 See Sjef van Erp, Arthur Salomons & Bram Akkermans (eds), The Future of European Property Law (Sellier 
European Law Publishers, 2012). This project is still insufficiently concerned with the redistributive dimension of 
ownership. 
63 Fertile synergies could emerge between mainstream EU property scholarship and new ‘common goods’ 
articulations. See Anna di Robilant, ‘Property and Deliberation’ (2013) (manuscript on file).  
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documents, for instance, it is funneled into EU conceptual buckets.64 It becomes a product that 
must be safe across Europe, must be priced correctly, and may open up new market 
opportunities.65  The strategy of social justice can then only be pursued obliquely, in the form of 
an exception to market principles in underserved regions. But at the level of EU policy design, 
social justice cannot partake of the richness of domestic and comparative property debates. It has 
to deploy contract rhetoric. It has to speak ‘marketese.’  Going forward, a new Manifesto should 
explore all the possibilities for social justice that the private law tradition may contain – not just 
those that happen to dovetail with the current competence divide between member states and 
Brussels.   
Linkages – At the heart of the 2004 Manifesto was the belief that private law had to be linked 
with larger questions of wealth distribution and with the politics of social justice. It is important, 
at this stage of European integration, to recall that linkage begins with discourse, and that 
discourse is the level –perhaps the only level– at which legal academia can make a difference. It 
is time, therefore, to branch out of traditional private law inquiries. At the risk of amateurism, 
scholars must venture into fields that intersect contract and property but go deeper into the 
distributive effects of European integration. The Commission’s trade deals with third countries, 
the criteria by which agricultural subsidies are distributed, the cycles of structural funding, the 
strictures of access to credit and all post-crisis regulatory constraints on markets must be on the 
radar screen of social justice research.  A scholarly project focusing only on the specialty areas 
of its members would resemble the proverbial drunk searching for his keys under the street light, 
knowing full well that the keys are somewhere else in the dark. 
                                                            
64 Bartl (n 54). 
65 European Commission,  ‘A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water Resources’ COM/2012/673 final,  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52012DC0673:EN:NOT. 
